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The United States Supreme Court, in its decision of March
22d, in the case of U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, de-
clares that combinations of railways formed for the purpose of
maintaining rates are illegal under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
of i8go, and in contravention of the Interstate Commerce Act of
x887. This decision, involving as it does such great questions
both of economics and of law, ranks in the opinion of the press
"scarcely second in its wide-reaching importance to any other
decision of the Supreme Court." The case arose in 1892, when
the United States District-Attorney of Kansas brought suit to
dissolve the Trans-Missouri Freight Association as a conspiracy.
in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. The defendant
association was composed of eighteen competing railway com-
panies which entered into a contract by which they agreed "not
to compete, to charge non-competitive rates on all competing
roads between the same termini, and to divide upon a certain
ratio all freights shipped by these routes not especially desig-
nated by the shipper to one road in preference to the others."
Although the' association in its original form was dissolved dur-
ing the progress of litigation, the agreement on rates was main-
tained by the roads and upheld by the Circuit Courts (53 Fed.
Rep. 440; 19 U. S. App. 36). The Supreme Court reversing
the judgments of the lower courts, decides, by the narrowest
majority, that such agreements are an unlawful restraint of
trade, and an attempt to monopolize interstate commerce.
The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham regards as the
two important questions demanding consideration, (1) whether
the Sherman Act applies to common carriers by railroad, and (2)
if so, whether the traffic agreement violated any provision of the
Act. As to the first question the court says, "The language of
the Act includes every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce, among the several States, or with foreign nations. Un-
less it can be said that an agreement, no mutter what its terms,
relating only to transportation, cannot restrain trade, we see no
escape from the conclusion that the agreement is condemned by
this act. It cannot be denied that those who are engaged in the
transportation of persons or property from one State to another
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are engaged in interstate commerce, and it would seem to fol-
low that if such persons enter into agreements between them-
selves in regard to the compensation to be secured from the
owners of articles transmitted, such agreement would at least
relate to the business of commerce, and might more or less
restrain it." The court also holds that the Interstate Com-
merce Act does not authorize an agreement of this nature. In
discussing the second question as to the true construction of the
statute, Mr. Justice Peckham denies the position of the defend-
ant association that the common-law meaning of the phrase
"contract in restraint of trade" includes only such contracts as
are in unreasonable restraint of trade. He calls attention to the
difficulty of judging as to what is a "reasonable rate" for trans-
portation, and contends that to say that the Act does not cover
agreements which are not in unreasonable restraint of trade and
which tend simply to keep up reasonable rates, is substantially
to leave the question of reasonableness to the companies them-
selves. In reply to defendant's argument that the prohibition
of agreements as to rates results in rate-cutting and prejudices
public interest, the court says, "It is a matter of common
knowledge that agreements as to rates have been continually
made of late years, and that complaints of each company in
regard to the violation of such agreements by its rivals have
been frequent and persistent. * * * Competition will itself
bring charges down to what may be reasonable, while in the
case of an agreement to keep prices up, competition is allowed
no play; it is shut out, and the rate is practically fixed by the
companies themselves by virtue of the agreement, so long as
they abide by it."
Toward the close of the majority opinion Mr. Justice Peck-
ham distinguishes the English case of the Mogul Steamship Co.
v. MacGregor (1892) App. Cas. 25, emphasized by the defendant
and the courts below, by the fact that that case was governed by
the common law, while the case at bar involves the interpreta-
tion of a statute. Thus the court's decision is made on the
ground that it must construe the law according to the language
used and not read into a statute what it may take to be the
intention of Congress.
The strong dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White holds
that the traffic agreement was only such as looked to the uni-
form classification of freight, by which secret under-cutting was
avoided and rates seeured against arbitrary and sudden changes.
His main argument was that to define the words "in restraint of
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trade" as embracing every contract which in any degree pro-
duced that effect would be violative of reason, because it would
include those contracts which are the very essence of trade and
every contract or combination by which workingmen seek tG
peaceably better their condition.
In reversing the greater part of the decision of Judge Locke
of the Southern District of Florida (78 Fed. 175), the Supreme
Court, in the case of the steamer Three Friends (17 Sup. Ct. 495),
has rendered a decision decidedly favorable to Spain, especially
considering the treatment some Americans have recently under-
gone at the hands of Spanish subjects. The steamer was seized
by the Collector of Customs of St. Johns, Florida, on the charge
that she was a filibustering steamer which had violated the neu-
trality laws in assisting the Cuban insurrectionists against Spain.
The main question turned upon the interpretation of Rev. St.
§5283, forbidding the fitting out and arming of a vessel with
intent that she be employed in the service of any Prince or
State, "or of any colony, district or people"-as to whether
these latter words included any insurgent body of people acting
together in conducting hostilities, although their belligerency
had not been recognized.
Chief-Justice Fuller, delivering the opinion of the court,
stated that it was true that in Wiborgv. U. S., x6 Sup. Ct. 1127,
1197, the court had referred to Sec. 5283 as dealing "with fitting
out and arming vessels in this country in favor of one foreign
power as against another foreign power with which we are at
peace"; but that was matter of general description only. The
bill is headed "Neutrality," which the Chief-Justice defines as
"abstinence from any participation' in a public, private or civil
war, and in impartiality of conduct toward both parties; but the
maintenance unbroken of peaceful relations between two powers
when the domestic peace of one of them is disturbed is not neu-
trality, when the disturbance has acquired such a head as to
have demanded the recognition of belligerency." As Attorney-
General Hoar pointed out (13 Op. Attys. Gen. U. S. 178), the
Act was not alone intended to secure neutral action, but also to
punish offenses against the United States. The crucial words,
"colony, district, or people," were said to have been inserted in
the original Act drawn by Hamilton in 1793, on the suggestion
by the Spanish Minister in i817 that the word "state" might not
include the South American Provinces in revolt, and not yet
recognized as independent. The reasonable conclusion is, that
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the inserted words were intended to include communities whose
belligerency had not been recognized, and Chief-Justice Marshall
in The Gran Para, 7 Wheat. 471, 489, seems to have been of this
opinion. While the word "people" may mean the entire body
of the inhabitants of a state, its meaning in this branch of the
section, taken in connection with the words "colony" and "dis-
trict" covers any insurgent body of people acting in concert,
although its belligerency has not been recognized. It belongs
to the political department to determine when belligerency
shall be recognized, but the present case sharply illustrates the
distinction between recognition of belligerency and recognition
of political revolt; for here the political department has not
recognized the existence of a de facto belligerent power, but
has, by many proclamations and messages, judicially informed
the court of the existence of an actual conflict of arms in resist-
ance of a government with which the United States is on terms
of peace and amity.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, considered that a very strained
construction had been put upon the statute-one not justified
by its words, or by any facts disclosed by the record, or by any
facts of a public character (i. e., documents issued by the Execu-
tive Branch of the Government) of which the court might take
judicial notice. He concurred entirely with the opinion of Judge
Locke of the District Court, whose main contentions were, that
the words "or of any colony, district or people" were added
simply as further description of both parties contemplated, and
that the courts were bound by the actions of the political branch
of the Government in the recognition of the political character
and relations of foreign nations, and of the conditions of peace
and war.
In the case of Henderson Bridge Co. v. Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532, the United States Supreme Court
rendered a decision on a question relative to interstate commerce
which may prove far-reaching in its consequences. The main
issue was as to the right of a State to tax the property of a com-
pany which by virtue of a State charter owned and operated a
bridge over the Ohio River, connecting the States of Kentucky
and Indiana. It appeared that the company derived its profits
from outsiders who used the bridge in the transaction of inter-
state business and paid tolls for this privilege. The court took
a technical view of this fact and decided that as it was not the
company but its customers who were engaged in interstate com-
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merce, a tax levied on the company by the State was legal and
valid. Mr. Justice White in a dissenting opinion, speaking for
three other justices, forcibly combats the position taken by the
majority of the court and maintains that inasmuch as the inter-
state commerce was carried on over the bridge, the company
owning the bridge and deriving its income from tolls paid by
the carriers of such commerce was engaged in interstate com-
merce, and therefore that the tax on its property was unconsti-
tutional and void. He holds, apparently with much reason, that
the contention of the majority of the court is a mere distinction
without a difference. The consequences of this decision, if the
rule laid down is extended in its application to other means of
interstate commerce, may well be disastrous. To quote from the
dissenting opinion: "A large portion of the interstate com-
merce business of the country is carried on by freight lines.
These lines arrange with the railways for transportation, pay
them a charge or toll and upon this basis afford the public
increased business facilities. Under the supposed distinction all
this interstate commerce traffic ceases to be such, and the whole
of the gross receipts become taxable in every State through
which the business passes. The freight lines do not transport
the merchandise; the railways do. Therefore, the receipts of
the freight lines as to such lines are not interstate commerce
receipts." The same reasoning would seem to apply to sleeping-
car companies and express companies.
